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I.

INTRODUCTION

With a significant number of Americans now vaccinated against
COVID-19,1 the end of the COVID-19 pandemic is finally in sight.2 The
end of the pandemic has brought forth a sense of renewed optimism

* American General Insurance Associate Professor of Insurance Law, Florida
State University. This author can be reached at cmarzen@fsu.edu.
** Powell Endowed Professor of Business Law, Angelo State University. This
author can be reached at mconklin@angelo.edu.
1. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Noah Weiland, With Vaccination Goal in Doubt,
Biden Warns of Variant’s Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/18 /us/politics/biden-vaccine-variants.html.
2. See Tomi Kilgore, The COVID-19 Pandemic Isn’t Over, but ‘The Great End Point’
Is in Site As More Than 120 Million Americans Are Fully Vaccinated, MARKETWATCH (May
14, 2021, 3:10 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-covid-19-pandemicisnt-over-but-the-great-end-point-is-in-site-as-nearly-120-million-americans-arefully-vaccinated-11621009380.
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in the United States,3 with restrictions being lifted,4 schools
reopening,5 baseball stadiums filled with spectators,6 and travel
resuming.7
However, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
resulting rise in individuals leaving their homes, has led to shortages
of some materials and items such as lumber,8 new cars,9 and
bicycles.10 Furthermore, in a new era of massive stimulus,11 a sharp
rise in inflation has resulted in increasing prices and sticker shock for

3. See Tim O’Donnell, Americans More Optimistic About the Future Than at Any
Point
Since
2006,
Poll
Finds,
YAHOO!
NEWS
(May
2,
2021),
https://news.yahoo.com/americans-more-optimistic-future-point-161600663.html.
4. See Erin Schumaker, US Sees Signs of ‘New Normal’ As States Lift COVID
Restrictions, ABC NEWS (June 1, 2021, 6:09 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/us-seessigns-normal-states-lift-covid-restrictions/story?id=77999357.
5. See Dana Goldstein, Schools Are Open, but Many Families Remain Hesitant to
Return,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
13,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/09/us/covid-school-reopening-virtuallearning.html.
6. See Jeff Tracy, Normalcy Is Returning to America’s Pastime, AXIOS (June 10,
2021), https://www.axios.com/baseball-stadiums-returning-capacity-coronavirus9c3b9e10-b178-4473-88ae-3e0725042179.html.
7. See Leslie Josephs, Air Travel Jumps as Vaccinations Spur Vacation Bookings,
Stocks
Surge,
CNBC
(Mar.
15,
2021,
6:06
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/15/air-travel-recovers-as-vaccinations-spurbookings.html.
8. E.g., Joanna Schwartz, A Lesson in Lumber Shortages, Buyer Preferences and
Supply
and
Demand,
FORBES
(June
15,
2021,
7:40
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2021/06/15/a-lesson-inlumber-shortages-buyer-preferences-and-supply-and-demand/?sh=7e98e5985bda.
9. E.g., Keira Wingate, New Car Shopping? Chip Shortage and Limited Supply
Could Mean Traveling to a Dealership Out of State, USA TODAY (June 17, 2021, 3:14 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2021/06/17/auto-sales-car-pricessemiconductor-chip-shortage/5294532001/.
10. E.g., Andrew Keshner, There’s a COVID-Related Bicycle Shortage in the U.S.,
MARKETWATCH (June 5, 2021, 2:08 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/whyis-there-a-bicycle-shortage-its-got-a-lot-to-do-with-why-fireworks-are-scarce11622751152.
11. See Jacob Pramuk, Biden Signs $1.9 Trillion Covid Relief Bill, Clearing Way for
Stimulus Checks, Vaccine Aid, CNBC (Mar. 11, 2021, 3:03 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/11/biden-1point9-trillion-covid-relief-packagethursday-afternoon.html.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss1/1
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consumers who are purchasing food,12 gasoline,13 used cars,14 and
airline tickets.15 This possible new era in inflation has led some
commentators to remark that the United States may be entering a
time during which an insidious economic problem may be emerging:
stagflation, a period of stagnant job and economic growth and
persistently high inflation.16
This Article endeavors to be the first law review article that
analyzes stagflation in American jurisprudence. The first part of this
Article discusses the history of stagflation and its prevalence,
particularly during the Carter administration. The Article then
analyzes how courts have historically considered stagflation in
American jurisprudence and examines several cases that have cited
stagflation in their analyses. The final part analyzes whether
stagflation may be considered a force majeure event. A number of
commentators have already started to address the question of
whether the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic is a force majeure
event.17 However, there is a glaring gap in the literature on the
12. See Millie Munshi, Food Inflation Hits Everything from Mayonnaise to Tofu,
BLOOMBERG
(June
11,
2021,
7:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-06-11/supply-chains-latestfood-inflation-means-higher-prices-for-tofu-and-mayonnaise.
13. See Jonathan Ponciano, Bacon, Gas, Cars: Here’s Everything Getting More
Expensive As Inflation Spikes, FORBES (May 12, 2021, 01:06 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanponciano/2021/05/12/heres-everythinggetting-more-expensive-as-inflation-spikes-prices-rise/?sh=37048f3a1967.
14. See James Politi & Colby Smith, ‘Kind of Crazy’: How the Booming US Used-Car
Market
Is
Driving
Inflation,
FIN.
TIMES
(June
3,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/70491b2f-6b6c-4489-ae14-706ed835c423.
15. See Leslie Josephs, Say Goodbye to $30 Plane Tickets. The Era of Dirt-Cheap
Flights
Is
Ending,
CNBC
(Mar.
23,
2021,
12:00
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/20/say-goodbye-to-30-plane-tickets-the-era-ofdirt-cheap-flights-is-ending.html.
16. See, e.g., Bill Poulos, Why Stagflation Is Coming for the US Economy, UNSEEN
OPPORTUNITY (May 28, 2021), https://www.unseenopp.com/why-stagflation-iscoming-for-the-us-economy/; Michele Schneider, Is Stagflation Creeping Up?,
INVESTING.COM (June 20, 2021, 4:22 AM), https://www.investing.com/analysis/isstagflation-creeping-up-200587133; see generally Stagflation, CORP. FIN. INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/stagflatio
n/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2021).
17. See, e.g., George P. Bernhardt & Jack Fersko, Feature the Covid-19 Issue the
Impacts of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Real Estate Contracts Force Majeure,
Frustration of Purpose, and Impossibility, 35 PROB. & PROP. 34, 34 (2021); Cosmos Nike
Nwedu, The Rise of Force Majeure Amid Coronavirus Pandemic: Legitimacy and
Implications for Energy Laws and Contracts, 61 NAT. RES. J. 1 (2021); James O’Reilly,
Force Majeure: How Much Have You Forgotten Since Law School, & Why Does That
Matter During COVID-19 Today?, 49 REAL EST. L.J. 220 (2021); Andrew A. Schwartz,
Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2020); King Fung Tsang, From
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question of whether stagflation qualifies as such an event. Utilizing
cases involving inflation and force majeure clauses as well as the
COVID-19 pandemic as comparisons, this Article addresses the
question of whether stagflation would qualify. With stagflation
possibly on the horizon in the United States, analysis of this question
will provide more clarity for contracting parties as well as the courts
in the event a period of stagflation occurs. Furthermore, such analysis
provides insight into the general principles of exceptions to
performance in business contracts.
II.
A.

THE HISTORY AND PERILS OF STAGFLATION

The Causes and Consequences of 1970s Stagflation

The term “stagflation” was coined during the 1973–1975
recession.18 It occurs when high levels of inflation coincide with
stagnant economic growth and high unemployment.19 The concept of
stagflation came as somewhat of a surprise in the 1970s because
conventional wisdom at the time held that high inflation and a
stagnant economy would not occur concurrently.20 Before its
appearance in the 1970s, economists thought such an occurrence was
impossible because inflation was a result of economic growth.21 From
1973–1975 there were five quarters with negative gross domestic
product.22 Inflation more than doubled in 1973, from 3.6% to 8.7%.23
The consumer price index measured double-digit annual inflation in
1974, 1979, and 1980.24 Unemployment peaked in 1975 at 8.5%.25
The cause of stagflation in the 1970s is debated. Some blame the
Coronation to Coronavirus: COVID-19, Force Majeure and Private International Law, 44
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 187 (2020).
18. Kimberly Amadeo, What Is Stagflation?, THE BALANCE (July 1, 2021),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-stagflation-3305964.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Dave Roos, What Is Stagflation and Why Is It So Dangerous?,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://money.howstuffworks.com/stagflation.htm (last visited
Dec. 5, 2021).
22. See Amadeo, supra note 18.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04023554&series_id=LNU04000000&series_id
=LNU03023554&series_id=LNU03000000&years_option=all_years&periods_option
=specific_periods&periods=Annual+Data (last visited Dec. 6, 2021).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss1/1
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“Nixon Shock.”26 This was a set of fiscal policies announced by
President Nixon in 1971 which included price and wage freezes, a
tariff on imports, and the abandonment of the gold standard for U.S.
currency.27 Some critics blame President Carter’s strategy of
increased government spending.28 Some point to the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973,
which resulted in record oil prices and increased the costs of
production and transportation of goods.29 Some blame the Federal
Reserve lowering interest rates in the 1960s.30 Others point to the
policies implemented by the Federal Reserve in the 1970s to fight
stagflation as a contributing factor.31 By alternating between raising
the federal funds rate to fight inflation and then lowering it to fight the
recession, the Federal Reserve confused businesses, which responded
by keeping prices high even when the federal funds rate was
lowered.32 This confusion also resulted in consumers expecting high
inflation rates, which resulted in less savings and more immediate
purchases, which further drove up inflation.33
The devastating effects of stagflation are made further
problematic when one considers the lack of viable options to combat
it, as evidenced by the events of the 1970s. Focusing on reducing
inflation by reducing consumer purchasing power serves to make
unemployment worse.34 Conversely, focusing on unemployment by
stimulating purchasing power and creating jobs makes inflation
worse.35 Some attribute the end of stagflation to policies enacted by
Chair of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker.36 In March of 1980,
Volcker raised the federal funds rate to an all-time high of 20%.37 By
26. Amadeo, supra note 18.
27. See id.
28. See Mike Moffatt, Economic Stagflation in a Historical Context, THOUGHTCO.
(Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/stagflation-in-a-historical-context1148155.
29. See Roos, supra note 21.
30. See id.
31. See Amadeo, supra note 18.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See
Whipping
Stagflation,
DIGIT.
HIST.,
https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid=3360
(last
visited Oct. 6, 2021).
35. See id.
36. See Kimberly Amadeo, Paul Volcker, THE BALANCE (June 21, 2021),
https://www.thebalance.com/who-is-paul-volcker-3306157.
37. See id.

5

6

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 42.1

consistently keeping the federal funds rate high, Volcker managed
expectations regarding inflation, which reduced business and
consumer behavior that had previously exacerbated inflation.38 This
solution came at a high cost, however, as it created the 1981
recession.39
B.

Stagflation in 2021

The rare nature of stagflation and the high number of variables
in the U.S. economy make predicting it far from an exact science.
However, there are some warning signs. In June of 2021, the Labor
Department reported the steepest increase in inflation since August
of 2008.40 Excluding food and energy prices, inflation had the largest
increase since June of 1992.41 Currently, certain commodity prices are
increasing at a rate not experienced since the late 1970s.42 In July
2021, the Labor Department’s report was even worse, nearly twice
the predicted level on a monthly basis.43
Some predict an upcoming stagflation crisis will be even worse
than that of the 1970s due to higher national debt levels.44 The
national debt throughout the 1970s never reached $1 trillion, while it
is currently set to approach $89 trillion by the end of 2029.45 This
would make addressing stagflation in 2021 far more challenging than
in the 1970s. The higher national debt will make it more difficult for
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Gwynn Guilford, U.S. Inflation Is Highest in 13 Years as Prices Surge 5%,
WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2021, 11:44 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-inflationconsumer-price-index-may-2021-11623288303.
41. See id.
42. See Jeffrey Kleintop, Is Stagflation Back?, CHARLES SCHWAB: MKT. COMMENT.
(May 10, 2021), https://www.schwab.com/resource-center/insights/content/isstagflation-back.
43. See Jeff Cox, Inflation Climbs Higher than Expected in June As Price Index Rises
5.4%,
CNBC
(July
13,
2021,
12:39
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/13/consumer-price-index-increases5point4percent-in-june-vs-5percent-estimate.html (inflation for the month of June
alone was 0.9%, while estimates were only 0.5%).
44. See Nouriel Roubini, The Looming Stagflationary Debt Crisis, PROJECT
SYNDICATE
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/stagflation-debt-crisis-2020s-by-nouriel-roubini-202106.
45. See Mike Patton, U.S. National Debt Expected to Approach $89 Trillion by
2029,
FORBES
(May
3,
2021,
12:27
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2021/05/03/us-national-debtexpected-to-approach-89-trillion-by-2029/?sh=1a69f3cd5f13.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss1/1
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the government to bail out banks, companies, and households while
servicing such high debts.46 Additional evidence supporting the
prediction of stagflation in 2021 are the trillions spent on stimulus
checks during the COVID-19 pandemic, the maintaining of near-zero
interest rates, and cryptocurrency investing hype.47 Current Chinese
fiscal policy could also exacerbate stagflation in the United States.48
However, predicting stagflation is far from an exact science. For
example, people warned of stagflation in 2011, which ultimately did
not occur.49 Additionally, some experts are not forecasting stagflation
in the near future. Arguments presented against forthcoming
stagflation are mainly focused on the temporary nature of present
conditions. While shortages in lumber, semiconductors, boxes, and
plastic lead to higher prices, some believe businesses are properly
responding to these shortages and will meet market demand in the
near future.50 Likewise, the current shortage of employees drives up
consumer prices.51 However, this may also be temporary, as the
supplemental unemployment benefits incentivizing workers to stay
out of the workforce were set to expire on September 6, 2021.52

46. See Theron Mohamed, ‘Dr. Doom’ Economist Nouriel Roubini Warns the
Global Economy Is Barreling Towards Stagflation – and Central Banks Face an
Impossible
Challenge,
MKTS.
INSIDER
(July
4,
2021,
8:00
AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/dr-doom-nouriel-roubinieconomist-stimulus-debt-supply-chain-stagflation-2021-7.
47. See id.
48. See Mark Gongloff, China’s Hot New Export Could Be Stagflation, BLOOMBERG
(June 2, 2021, 5:14 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-0602/china-s-hot-new-export-could-be-stagflation.
49. See Amadeo, supra note 18.
50. See Mark Sievers, Wealth Matters: Inflation or Stagflation? That’s Now the
Question, DAILY REPUBLIC (June 13, 2021), https://www.dailyrepublic.com/all-drnews/solano-news/solano-business/local-business-columnists/wealth-mattersinflation-or-stagflation-thats-now-the-question/.
51. See id.
52. See Laura Michelle Davis & Oscar Gonzalez, Pandemic Unemployment
Benefits Expired on Labor Day. Could They Be Renewed?, CNET (Sept. 18, 2021, 8:00
AM),
https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/could-federal-unemploymentbenefits-be-restored-in-your-state-what-to-know/ (noting that twenty-six state
governors claimed pandemic-related unemployment benefits were producing limited
incentives for workers to take jobs. However, while some states attempted to end the
benefits before the federal expiration, successful lawsuits brought in various states,
such as in Maryland, Arkansas, and Indiana, forced the state to preserve the federal
coverage).
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway

An environmentalist group attempted to stop the U.S. Navy from
dredging a deeper and wider channel in the Thames River to
accommodate a new class of submarine.53 The dredging itself was not
being challenged.54 Rather, it was the relocation of 2.8 million cubic
yards of the polluted, dredged spoil to a site in New London,
Connecticut.55 The plaintiffs complained this would pollute the New
London dump site, that the decision to choose this site was “arbitrary
and capricious,” and the agencies involved did not comply with
procedural requirements in the decision-making requirements.56 The
plaintiffs asked for permanent injunctive relief against dumping the
spoil at the New London dump site.57
The district court held that the Army Corps of Engineers was
provided adequate information to inform its decision and that the
Corps considered the full impact of its decision, its available
alternatives, and it acted in good faith in considering where to relocate
the spoil.58 The district court made explicit reference to stagflation in
explaining why the Navy was allowed to use an outside consultant. 59
It reasoned that if outside consultants were not allowed, federal
agencies without enough projects to justify a full-time employee to
draft impact statements might turn to utilizing existing employees
who are ill-equipped to do so.60 Alternatively, small agencies might
be forced to hire full-time experts for whom there is only part-time
work.61 Either way, the district court reasoned, “[w]ith the economy
already in a tailspin due to ‘stagflation,’ this court will not compel such
a wasteful result.”62
The environmental groups appealed the district court opinion to

53.
1974).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 389 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (D. Conn.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1268.
See id. at 1270.
See id. at 1276–89.
See id. at 1274.
See id.
See id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss1/1
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.63 There, the
court reversed in part and remanded in part, holding that the Navy
did not meet certain procedural requirements.64 The Second Circuit
made no reference to stagflation, either express or implied.
B.

In re Dortch

Stagflation has even made an appearance in a court decision
relating to an application for admission to the Maryland bar. In re
Dortch involved an individual who served fifteen years in prison but
later graduated from law school.65 In Dortch, the applicant to the
Maryland bar had an accomplished career prior to a criminal
conviction.66 During high school, the applicant was president of the
student council as well as captain of the varsity football team and
varsity basketball team.67 Following high school, he earned a
bachelor’s degree from Howard University and served in the U.S.
Army during the Vietnam War, where he was wounded trying to save
another soldier.68 After his military service, he worked as a life
insurance agent for five years.69
In 1974, the applicant started an operational holding company.70
However, this company of ten to fifteen employees encountered
financial difficulties because sales did not live up to projections. 71
Specifically, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that stagflation was
a factor in the difficulties with the applicant’s business.72
In the wake of the failure of the business, the applicant led a
conspiracy to commit armed robbery.73 He was convicted of second
degree murder, conspiracy to commit a felony, and attempted armed
robbery.74 He was sentenced to fifteen years to life imprisonment.75
63. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
64. See id. at 82–83.
65. See 687 A.2d 245, 246–47 (Md. 1997).
66. See id. at 246.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 246–47.
72. See id. at 247 (“In addition, the United States, at the time, was experiencing
‘stagflation,’ rampant inflation combined with high unemployment, which was
caused, in part, by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ oil embargo.”).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 246.
75. See id.

9
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The applicant was a model prisoner while incarcerated and was
released on parole after fifteen years.76 One year after his release
from prison, he started his legal studies at the University of the
District of Columbia School of Law, where he served as the president
of the student bar association and was praised by faculty members for
his “leadership skills, honesty, conscientiousness, maturity,
compassion,
tirelessness,
responsibility,
accessibility,
trustworthiness, energy, intellect and oral communication skills.”77
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the applicant’s
admission to the bar was premature.78 A key factor in this decision
was the fact that the applicant was still on parole.79 The Maryland
Court of Appeals also cited80 a decision of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan which reasoned that an
attorney on parole could represent criminal defendants and
potentially encounter a conflict of interest due to the attorney’s
adversarial relationship with the Federal Probation Office.81 Overall,
the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that it would not entertain a
petition for admission to the bar in the circumstance when a person
was still on parole “for a crime so severe that disbarment would be
clearly necessitated if the crime were committed by an attorney.”82
C.

Theofanis v. Theofanis

Finally, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
discussed stagflation in the decision of the family law case Theofanis
v. Theofanis.83 Theofanis involved a high net-worth divorce, with
multiple homes, multiple vehicles, a boat, and a successful floral
business.84 The parties negotiated a resolution of all collateral issues
incident to the request for divorce, and placed the settlement terms
on the record in late 2007; the court entered an amended joint order
of divorce on January 8, 2008.85 Pursuant to the agreement, the
76. See id. at 247.
77. Id. at 248.
78. See id. at 251.
79. See id. at 250.
80. See id. at 249–50.
81. See In re Culpepper, 770 F. Supp. 366, 374 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
82. In re Dortch, 687 A.2d at 251.
83. See No. A-5943-08T3, 2011 WL 611869, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb.
23, 2011).
84. See id. at *1.
85. See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol42/iss1/1
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husband retained the business, and in exchange for a waiver with
respect to the business as well as alimony, the wife received a $1
million lump sum distribution.86
However, in 2008 the U.S. economy entered a financial crisis,87
and the resulting recession was the worst in the country since the
Great Depression.88 The husband moved to modify the personal
settlement agreement, alleging that the downturn in the economy
with increased rental costs caused the floral business’s valuation to be
much less than that was utilized in the agreement.89 The trial court
denied the husband’s motion to vacate the personal settlement
agreement.90
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
affirmed the trial court’s ruling.91 In New Jersey, relief from a final
judgment of divorce—and personal settlement agreement—is
available only if a situation meets the standard of “exceptional
circumstances.”92 The husband argued on appeal that the economic
downturn of the 2008 financial crisis would result in a windfall to his
wife and a detriment to him.93 In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the
appellate court noted that although the 2008 financial crisis was not
a foreseeable event, “the possibility of financial constraints were
known.”94 Importantly, the court cited stagflation in its analysis that
the possibility of financial constraints were known, noting that the
husband’s floral business had survived “inflation, stagflation and
lower consumer spending.”95
D. Other Courts Referencing Stagflation
At least two other courts have briefly mentioned stagflation. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

86. See id. at *2.
87. See Mark Landler, Global Fears of a Recession Grow, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/business/worldbusiness/07global.html.
88. See Floyd Norris, In Great Recession, Other Nations Have Suffered More, N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/18/business/18charts.html.
89. See Theofanis, 2011 WL 611869, at *3.
90. See id.
91. See id. at *6.
92. Id. at *5.
93. See id. at *6.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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briefly referenced stagflation parenthetically in Union Electric Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which involved a dispute
between a utility and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
regarding a rate approval order.96 Additionally, the Ohio Court of
Appeals mentioned stagflation briefly in a footnote in a case involving
the interpretation of a rent escalation clause in a commercial lease
contract.97
IV.

STAGFLATION AS A FORCE MAJEURE EVENT

With the threat of stagflation on the horizon in the United States,
an arrival may potentially become a significant factor as courts make
decisions in the contract law area. There remains an open question—
would stagflation constitute an adequate force majeure event or
provide grounds for the invocation of commercial impracticability?
Judicial precedent from cases involving inflation, force majeure, and
commercial impracticability provide an indication of how courts may
rule in the event a party invokes stagflation as a force majeure event
to excuse contractual nonperformance.
A.

Background of Force Majeure Clauses

When a party to a contract does not perform its obligations, there
are statutory and common law defenses that permit the party in
breach to be excused from performance. Examples of particular
importance to this Article include impossibility of performance,98

96. See 890 F.2d 1193, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
97. See Cap. Equity, Ltd. v. Metromedia Steakhouses, Inc., No. 92AP-1498, 1993
WL 104904, at *4 n.4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1993).
98. See generally 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 642 (2021) (“For the purposes of
extinguishing a promisor’s liability because a contractual promise becomes
objectively impossible to perform, there are two kinds of impossibility: original and
supervening. Original impossibility is impossibility of performance existing when the
contract was made, so that the contract was to do something that was impossible
from the outset, while supervening impossibility develops after the contract in
question is formed, and exists when the subject matter of the contract for which the
parties bargained is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being performed
due to an unforeseen, supervening act for which the promisor is not responsible.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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destruction of subject matter,99 commercial impracticability,100 and
frustration of performance.101 Parties to a contract that prefer to have
more protection in the event they are unable to perform their
obligations may include a force majeure clause.102 Such a clause
excuses a party from performance under certain events or
circumstances. The force majeure clause therefore affects the balance
in a contract between the dueling notions of “legal certainty” and
“reasonableness and equity.”103 Namely, it increases reasonableness
and equity—by excusing nonperformance in situations outside the
control of the nonperforming party—at the cost of legal certainty.104
Force majeure clauses generally protect against extreme events
that are “commonly considered to be caused by overpowering,
superior, or irresistible force, such as an act of God, which is beyond
the reasonable control of the parties and cannot be avoided by the
exercise of due care.”105 However, parties to a contract are free to set
the terms for an event that triggers the clause more broadly if
desired,106 as long as such terms are not “manifestly unreasonable.”107
The “manifestly unreasonable” standard is inherently subjective and
will vary depending on the parties involved and the subject matter of

99. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 263 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“If
the existence of a specific thing is necessary for the performance of a duty, its failure
to come into existence, destruction, or such deterioration as makes performance
impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made.”).
100. See generally P.J.M. Declercq, Modern Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force
Majeure Clauses in Situations of Commercial Impracticability, 15 J.L. & COM. 213, 216
(1995) (“In a case of commercial impracticability, performance is still possible and
the purpose of the contract can still be fulfilled. However, due to a change in
circumstances, the performance of the promisor’s obligations has become
economically senseless.”).
101. See generally id. at 217 (“In ‘frustration of purpose’ cases, performance is
still possible, but an unanticipated circumstance, the risk of which cannot fairly be
thrown on the promisor, makes performance vitally different from what was
originally to be expected.”).
102. See id. at 224 (explaining that the doctrine of commercial impracticability
under Section 2-615 of the U.C.C. “provides a minimum standard for excuse beyond
which an agreement may not go,” while force majeure clauses “enlarge upon or
supplant the provisions of U.C.C. Section 2-615”).
103. Id. at 214.
104. It is at the cost of legal certainty because it is not always clear whether an
event that allows for nonperformance under a force majeure clause has occurred.
105. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. S. E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 392, 400 (Ky. 1992).
106. See id.
107. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
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the contract.108 Courts do not interpret force majeure clauses in
isolation; they are interpreted against the backdrop of the entire
contract.109
Force majeure clauses generally contain enumerated
circumstances in which nonperformance is allowed, followed by a
generic, catch-all phrase, such as “other events beyond the reasonable
control of the parties.”110 However, courts are more likely to allow
nonperformance when the intervening event was explicitly
mentioned in the force majeure clause rather than when it was only
implied based on a generic, catch-all provision.111 The doctrine of
ejusdem generis is particularly relevant to force majeure clauses. The
doctrine states that when a court is interpreting a contractual clause
that contains specific provisions and a generic provision, the generic
clause will only be interpreted to include events similar to the events
explicitly listed in the generic clause.112 This issue can be minimized
by explicitly stating in the generic, catch-all phrase that it applies
“whether of the kind described herein or otherwise.”113
If a nonperforming party to a contract attempts to use the
generic, catch-all provision of a force majeure clause, courts will
generally require the intervening event to be unforeseeable at the
time the contract was entered into—specifically enumerated events
listed in a force majeure clause do not require unforeseeability.114 If
this interpretation is undesirable to the parties, they may expressly
eliminate such a foreseeability requirement when drafting the force
majeure clause.115
108. See Declercq, supra note 100, at 231.
109. See id. at 228.
110. Jay D. Kelley, So What’s Your Excuse? An Analysis of Force Majeure Claims, 2
TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 91, 98 (2007).
111. See, e.g., Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987)
(“Ordinarily, only if the force majeure clause specifically includes the event that
actually prevents a party’s performance will that party be excused.”).
112. See, e.g., Maralex Res., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 76 P.3d 626, 636 (N.M. 2003) (the
case involved an oil and gas lease with a force majeure clause that provided the lease
would not terminate in the event production was “prevented by an act of God, of the
public enemy, labor disputes, inability to obtain material, failure of transportation, or
other cause beyond the control of the Lessee.” The court held that the generic catchall of “or other cause beyond the control of the Lessee” was limited to external factors
because all of the specifically enumerated examples were external events).
113. Kelley, supra note 110, at 114 (furthermore, prefacing the explicitly listed
events in the force majeure clause with “including, without limitation . . . ” will also
help) (citations omitted).
114. See id. at 101.
115. See Declercq, supra note 100, at 237.
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In order to be freed from a contractual obligation, a force majeure
clause may require the nonperforming party to comply with
provisions, such as giving notice to the other party.116 After a contract
is terminated by a force majeure act, contractual obligations are
terminated even if the force majeure event resolves itself and the
contract becomes possible again.117
B.

Force Majeure and Inflation

With so few reported court cases citing stagflation specifically, it
is unclear how courts might analyze stagflation as a force majeure
event. Given that inflation is a key component of stagflation,
examining cases involving inflation, force majeure clauses, and
commercial impracticability provides a comparison to predict the
likely outcome of using stagflation to excuse nonperformance.
Commercial impracticability has been a defense to contract
performance in some cases in which inflation has arguably made
contract performance impracticable for one party. With contracts for
the sale of goods, Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 2-615(a)
provides an excuse for delay in delivery or non-delivery of goods “if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made[.]”118
One of the first cases that involved inflation and commercial
impracticability was Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School District.119 In
Maple Farms, a milk supplier sought to terminate its contract for
selling milk to a school district during the 1973–1974 school year due
to a steep increase in the price of raw milk.120 The contract was
entered into by the dairy farm and the school district on June 15, 1973,
at which time the price of raw milk was $8.03 cwt.121 However, by
December 1973, the price of raw milk increased approximately 23%

116. See, e.g., L & A Jackson Enters. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 22 (1997), aff’d,
135 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a contractor was not allowed to excuse
nonperformance because he did not request an extension nor provide weather data
demonstrating the alleged cause of nonperformance as required by the contract).
117. See Suzen M. Grieshop Corrada, The Best Laid Plans: Force Majeure Clauses
in Travel and Event Contracts, 31 NOVA L. REV. 409, 418 (2007).
118. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
119. See 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Chemung Cnty. 1974).
120. See id. at 786.
121. See id.
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to $9.89 cwt.122
The dairy farm asserted common law claims of impossibility of
performance and frustration of performance as well as a claim under
UCC § 2-615 (commercial impracticability) in seeking to terminate the
contract.123 In rejecting the dairy farm’s arguments to terminate the
contract, the New York Supreme Court noted that the increase in the
price of milk was not a “totally unexpected” occurrence.124 The court
specifically remarked that a nearly 10% increase in the price of raw
milk had occurred from early 1972 until when the contract was
entered on June 15, 1973.125 In addition, the court also stated that the
dairy farm would have been aware of the inflationary conditions in
the United States at the time the contract was entered into.126 Thus,
both parties, including the dairy farm, entered the contract with
knowledge of increasing raw milk prices.127 Finally, the court noted
that the dairy farm could have included an exculpatory clause in the
contract to offer relief from performance if the cost of raw milk
increased—but it failed to do so.128 Despite taking a loss under the
contract,129 the dairy farm assumed the risk of loss by entering into
the agreement under the circumstances.130
Significant inflation in price also was found not to constitute
commercial impracticability in Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Atlas
Corp.131 In this case, the seller of uranium yellowcake sought
reformation of a contract for the sale of the product due to alleged
significant cost increases.132 The seller cited several reasons that
allegedly made it commercially impracticable to perform its
obligations under the contract: an OPEC oil embargo; unforeseen
environmental and safety regulations enacted at the federal
government level; inflation of wages, chemical costs, and equipment
costs; and general conditions in the uranium market.133
122. See id.
123. See id. at 787.
124. Id. at 789.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 790.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 787.
130. See id. at 790.
131. See 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 603 F.2d
1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
132. See id. at 131.
133. See id. at 134.
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The seller even cited a 58.4% increase in the price of uranium
yellowcake above the contract price in their claim of commercial
impracticability.134 However, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa noted that the seller had good reason to
anticipate rising costs and expenditures due to new regulations,
despite other unforeseen phenomena.135 In addition, the court
mentioned that the seller entered into a longer term contract to
strengthen its ability to obtain future corporate financing, so it had
knowledge that it might lose money with the contract.136 Finally, the
court stated that the seller was in a good position to allocate its risk
among other buyers of uranium such that it could have an advantage
on other contracts with greater profit margins and increased
prices.137
In declining to adopt the seller’s position regarding commercial
impracticability, the court specifically observed that price increases of
50% to 58% are not enough to excuse contractual obligations.138 In
the end, the court held that the seller failed to prove the extent to
which the price increases were due to unforeseen reasons and that
the situation it found itself in was not due to its own actions.139
However, not all courts have rejected commercial
impracticability in cases of severe inflation. In Aluminum Co. of
America v. Essex Group, Inc., the parties entered into a toll conversion
service contract in which the seller company converted alumina
supplied by the buyer company into aluminum for that company.140
The contract entered into by the parties was to last from 1967 until
1983.141 However, in 1973 an increase in pollution control costs as
well as the cost of oil increased the electricity costs of the seller.142
This caused an unexpected and massive increase in the production
costs of the seller, well beyond an indexed increase within the
contract price.143 The seller presented evidence that it would
potentially lose over $60 million throughout the course of the contract

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id. at 139–40.
See id. at 134–35.
See id. at 135.
See id. at 140.
See id.
See id. at 132–33.
See 499 F. Supp. 53, 57 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
See id.
See id. at 58.
See id.
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due to the increased costs.144
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania remarked that the emphasis of the doctrine of
commercial impracticability was on hardship.145 Considering the fact
that the seller would potentially lose approximately $60 million under
the contract, the court found that the “strict standard of severe
disappointment” was met in the case and that the performance cost
increase was “severe enough” to justify relief.146 The court thus
ordered reformation of the contract.147
C.

Stagflation, Commercial Impracticability, and Force Majeure
Clauses

With the threat of stagflation hovering over the U.S. economy
today, courts may be faced with a party to a contract seeking
termination and/or reformation of the contract due to stagflation.
However, any parties seeking to invoke stagflation as an event that
constitutes commercial impracticability will likely run into the
dilemma that such a condition is more foreseeable.
D. Stagflation and Commercial Impracticability
The decisions of the New York Supreme Court in Maple Farms
and the Northern District of Iowa in Iowa Electric Light & Power
illustrate that even inflation exceeding 50% in the price of goods or
materials is insufficient to establish commercial impracticability.148
Aluminum Co. of America, the exception to the rule on inflation,
exemplifies that a party seeking contract relief due to stagflation
would have to demonstrate severe hardship, a substantial bar.149
A key question as to whether stagflation could excuse a party
from performance through the doctrine of commercial
impracticability is whether stagflation is foreseeable. An era of
stagflation that could arise today would emerge in the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic. As one federal bankruptcy judge in Florida

144. See id. at 73.
145. See id. at 72.
146. Id. at 73.
147. See id. at 80.
148. See 52 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. Chemung Cnty. 1974); see also 467 F. Supp.
129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
149. See 499 F. Supp. 53, 57 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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noted, “[t]here is no question that the COVID-19 pandemic was
completely unforeseeable.”150 However, by contrast, a period of
stagflation is arguably foreseeable—consider the opinion of the
appellate court in New Jersey with the Theofanis case.151 The fact that
the husband was experiencing difficulties with the floral business in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis was not grounds to invalidate a
personal settlement agreement, especially where that husband’s
business had survived the stagflation of the 1970s.152
Individuals in their sixties, seventies, and eighties likely have
memories and personal experiences of living through an era of
stagflation. There is a saying that “history repeats itself.” 153
Contracting parties should be aware of the very real threat of
stagflation today, and the warning signs from the elevated prices of
lumber, used cars, and other consumer goods today may very well be
the harbingers of a period of stagflation. Furthermore, stagflation is
more a creation of human hands, whereas other situations (e.g., a
pandemic) are more of a natural occurrence.154 Future courts are
likely to deny relief on the basis of commercial impracticability when
only stagflation is present.
E.

Stagflation and Force Majeure

Would stagflation constitute a force majeure event? Parties in a
contract may certainly utilize strategic contracting to protect their
interests in an era of high unemployment and high inflation.155
Several recent cases involving the COVID-19 pandemic and force
majeure provisions provide guidance on the drafting of force majeure
clauses to encompass a stagflation event.
Courts across the country are now facing claims by commercial
tenants seeking relief from commercial leases due to financial

150. In re Cinemex USA Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 627 B.R. 693, 700 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2021).
151. See No. A-5943-08T3, 2011 WL 611869, at *6 n.6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Feb. 23, 2011).
152. See id. at 16-18.
153. David Baker, History Repeats Itself. That’s Bad News for the 2020s, THE
CONVERSATION (Jan. 2, 2020, 4:56 PM), https://theconversation.com/history-repeatsitself-thats-bad-news-for-the-2020s-127116.
154. See Civil Action No. CV 20-4223, 2021 WL 1193100, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
2021) (citation omitted).
155. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law As a Source of
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 762–63 (2010).
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difficulties faced while the businesses were closed at the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in 1600 Walnut Corp. v. Cole Haan
Co. Store, a footwear and accessories company sought a discharge of
its contractual obligations under an eleven-year lease due to
impracticability of performance, impossibility, and frustration of
purpose following closure due to restrictions imposed by the
Governor of Pennsylvania in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.156
However, the force majeure clause of the lease specifically defined
“another reason not the fault of or beyond the reasonable control of
the party delayed” to be a force majeure event.157 Despite restrictive
governmental laws or regulations constituting a force majeure event,
the clause also stated that a force majeure event “shall not. . . relieve
Tenant from the obligation to pay Rent.”158 Interpreting this clause,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted
“another reason not the fault of or beyond the reasonable control of
the party delayed[,]” and denied relief to the footwear and accessories
company.159
A state appellate court in New York also examined the frustration
of purpose defense in A/R Retail LLC v. Hugo Boss Retail, Inc.160 This
case involved a thirteen-year lease between a commercial landlord
and retail tenant.161 The contract at issue included in the force
majeure provision that “order or regulations of or by any
governmental authority” would constitute a force majeure event.162
In addition, the lease agreement noted that a force majeure event
would not excuse “Tenant’s obligations to pay any sums of money due
under the terms of this Agreement[.]”163 The retail tenant sought
relief from the lease through rescission or reformation due to
frustration of purpose as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.164
In rejecting the application of the frustration of purpose defense,
the New York Supreme Court remarked that “[t]he pandemic
triggered several months of ‘shutdown’ followed by an evolving set of

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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capacity restrictions that have reduced (but not eliminated) Tenant’s
ability to generate revenue from its retail operation.”165 Furthermore,
the court made the observation that the risk of government
restrictions on the utilization of the premises were also foreseen, as
such a contingency was provided for in the force majeure clause.166
However, not all courts have denied relief to tenants seeking
release from their leases as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. For
instance, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Florida, in In Re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., relieved a
movie theater business from the obligation to pay rent to a
commercial landlord during the time period when movie theaters
were shut down during the pandemic.167 The force majeure clause
included “governmental action” and “other conditions similar to those
enumerated in this Section beyond the reasonable control of the party
obligated to perform” within its scope.168 The court also noted that
the COVID-19 pandemic was a “completely unforeseeable” event “and
certainly not the fault of either contract party.”169
The lessons of the foregoing cases illustrate the importance of
defining stagflation as a force majeure event within a contractual
clause. As the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1600 Walnut Corp.
observed, common law theories for contractual relief should only
determine allocation of risk between the parties in the event there is
an absence of a contractual allocation of risk.170 As the Florida District
Court of Appeals also noted, common law defenses to contract
enforcement are not available “if the relevant business risk was
foreseeable at the inception of the agreement and could have been the
subject of an express contractual agreement.”171 Stagflation is
positioned as a very real risk in 2021, and now prominent voices such
as economist Nouriel Roubini are issuing warnings about
approaching stagflation.172 Stagflation is arguably a foreseeable event,
165. Id. at 823.
166. See id. at 825.
167. See 627 B.R. 693 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021).
168. Id. at 699.
169. Id. at 700.
170. See Civil Action No. CV 20-4223, 2021 WL 1193100, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
2021).
171. Home Design Ctr.—Joint Venture v. Cnty. Appliances of Naples, Inc., 563
So.2d 767, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
172. See Paula Froelich, Economist Nouriel Roubini Warns of ‘Train Wreck’ Stock
Market Crash and ‘Stagflation,’ N.Y. POST (July 3, 2021, 4:53 PM),
https://nypost.com/2021/07/03/economist-roubini-warns-of-stock-market-crash-
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and its inclusion as a force majeure event within a force majeure
clause should be a subject of negotiation with parties to commercial
contracts.
So, if stagflation is included within a force majeure clause
between two parties in a commercial contract, how should it be
defined? As prior cases indicated, even price inflation exceeding 50%
may not be enough to justify commercial impracticability. Parties
wishing to draft a force majeure clause that protects against
stagflation should consider explicitly defining the term. This is
because the standard definition of stagflation as “[p]ersistent high
inflation combined with high unemployment and stagnant demand in
a country’s economy”173 is inherently subjective. Thresholds for
exactly what constitutes “high” inflation, “high” unemployment, and
stagnant economic growth should be expressly defined. Likewise, an
explicit time period for which these events need to occur to be
considered “persistent” should be defined. Finally, parties may decide
to allow force majeure protections even when two of the three prongs
of stagflation are present.174
V.

CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic brought about numerous issues
regarding contractual obligations—most notably, the ability of a party
to excuse nonperformance through commercial impracticability or a
force majeure clause. This first-of-its-kind Article provides valuable
insight into how post-COVID-19 stagflation would likely be viewed by
courts as an excuse for nonperformance. The very real threat of
stagflation in the near future is problematic for businesses, not only
because of the likely harm from reduced sales but also because the
media coverage of the threat means that it is foreseeable; therefore, it
would likely not be covered under a theory of commercial
impracticability or in a generic force majeure clause. A further
problem for business owners is that attempting to include stagflation
and-stagflation/.
173. Stagflation, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/stagflation
(last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
174. To make matters even more complex, parties may wish to implement a
totality-of-the-circumstances type sliding scale.
For example, one could
hypothetically posit that “stagflation is defined as when the average percentage
change in unemployment increases, inflation increases, and U.S. GDP decreases
exceed 6%.” This way, force majeure protections may be enacted if two of the factors
are exceptionally high despite one factor remaining low.
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language in a force majeure clause will not be a simple task, as
multiple interrelated terms must be defined. In the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic, stagflation and the law may become highly
relevant to parties, policymakers, and the courts.
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